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8 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: PROCIB Members

SUBJECT: Emergency Planning

Pursuant to instruction from the United States Intelligence Board (D-7.1/2, 5 June 1959) each Committee under the Intelligence Board was directed to report plans for operating in time of emergency to the Board by 1 October 1959.

There is attached a draft emergency plan which will be on the agenda for agreement at the 23 September 1959 meeting of PROCIB.

[Redacted Signature]

Secretary

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8 September 1959

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON PROCUREMENT OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS
EMERGENCY PLANNING

PROBLEM

To describe the responsibilities and operations of the Committee on Procurement during an emergency.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That at least a portion of Headquarters activity has been relocated.
2. That the intelligence community continues to function.

DISCUSSION

1. In an emergency situation great disruption can be expected in the flow of foreign publications through normal channels. This disruption would be especially marked in the case of publications originating from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Some materials en route at the outbreak of the emergency, including many received through peripheral countries, would doubtless get through to the continental United States. However, it would almost certainly be impossible to place new requests for direct delivery of bloc publications after the outbreak.
2. Immediately following the outbreak of a nuclear war, even the most elementary activities for the procurement and screening of foreign publications

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would probably be suspended. Available personnel would be assigned more directly to the converting of finished, evaluated intelligence to answer immediate intelligence problems. Even if manpower were available for screening publications already received or in transit at the time of the outbreak, it is highly unlikely that analysts would be free to use the publications or that the type of information in open literature would be able to compete with finished intelligence for the attention of intelligence consumers. Exceptions might occur due to a concentration of language capability, knowledge that valuable information appears in a publication just issued, etc., but these would by no means set a standard pattern of operation until the situation had at least partially stabilized.

3. In the event of conventional warfare or the near normal aftermath of a nuclear attack, many sources of foreign publications should be tapped as soon as possible. Information on enemy countries and other areas of priority intelligence interest would appear in the regular press and the refugee press in neutral countries. Publications from denied areas would soon become available through the black market or might be openly available from refugees. Procurement activity at peripheral posts should be expanded, perhaps by the reassignment of Foreign Service and military personnel previously stationed within the target areas and therefore familiar with the current situation. It might also be advisable to station at such posts linguists or analysts from Headquarters or from other areas.

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Precedents from World War II include the press monitoring activity at Zurich and the gathering of Far Eastern materials in Paris as soon as it was reoccupied.

4. In wartime, another source of foreign publications would be by military capture. Although jurisdictionally outside the purview of PROCIB, this source will be considered briefly because of the need for close coordination of all procurement capabilities. In response to a JCS directive, the armed services have established the framework and general procedures for an Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC). (See CONFIDENTIAL Joint Regulation SR 380-350-2 (Army), OPNAV Instr. 0386.3 (Navy), and AFOIN-C/DD 350.09 (Air Force), issued 6 July 1951 with the title "Military Security: Captured Enemy Documents.") In the early stages of war, the flow of captured documents that could be sorted and shipped to the Zone of the Interior would probably be limited to items of immediate military significance. If a stalemate lasted for a period of months, the flow of captured documents would increase and screening procedures would doubtless make available appropriate publications for general intelligence exploitation. The non-military receiving point operating under the guidance of PROCIB would be well suited for sifting such publications so as to make most effective use of duplicate copies, and would also have the best available familiarity with non-USIB requirements for foreign publications. The availability of some publications through ASDIC should not lead to the relaxing of efforts at procurement through non-military channels for the following reasons: (a) Military needs would probably receive priority

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attention at all ASDIC echelons; (b) most of the materials received via ASDIC would be quite different in content from the normal flow of foreign publications. (c) There would be no way of predicting with certainty the availability via ASDIC of any particular title or type of publication.

5. Means of procurement would be varied in an emergency, even more than during normal times. State Department channels would continue to be used as appropriate. Consideration should be given to the use of military personnel outside combat areas, perhaps including civilians in uniform with simulated rank, who could make arrangements for travel, billeting, etc., far more readily than civilians. The independent procurement activities of book dealers, libraries, and private individuals might fill gaps in Governmental procurement. In a national emergency such organizations as the Association of Research Libraries, the American Library Association, the American Booksellers Association, the Council on Library Resources, and the several academic groups concerned with regional research resources could be of great help in providing prompt access to a significant flow of foreign publications, both through such commercial channels as might still be functioning and through their overseas counterparts.

6. The physical processing of publications, including receiving, listing, checking for duplication, checking against specific and general requirements, and distributing, would be quite complex. The flow would be erratic, varying

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from part of a shipload to a mere trickle. Speed of selective distribution would be even more important than in peacetime. Communications with the field would call for prompt but careful phrasing in a constantly changing situation. This activity should take place near one or more receiving points, with adequate transportation routes leading to the Relocation Sites of interested agencies. However, there would be no way to guarantee that any particular port would be usable, nor would there be any certainty that shipments by sea or air would be routed directly to the main receiving and distribution point. A dozen suitable towns or cities should be identified in advance.

7. Coordination of civilian and military procurement in a rapidly changing situation would require forceful management, supported by community-wide endorsement as expressed through PROCIB or some other representative group. A director of publication procurement might serve as the executive agent of the intelligence community. Non-USIB agencies would probably continue to name representatives to PROCIB, as in peace time, to assure appropriate disposition of publications not exclusively or urgently needed by USIB agencies. With adequate operational leadership much committee activity could be done remotely by memorandum or telephone rather than by formal meeting.

8. It would become more important than in peace time that the members of PROCIB use the committee as a forum in which to offer procurement capability as well as to talk over their requirements.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. During a nuclear attack or immediately following the outbreak of any type of war involving the United States, it would not be feasible to initiate action for the procurement of foreign publications; PROCIB activity during this period would be limited to highly selective sorting and distributing of such priority publications as were received as a result of previously initiated procurement action.
2. Based on experience during World War II, foreign publications would be essential to the intelligence effort in an extended emergency and could be effectively obtained only by forceful and coordinated direction from a committee such as PROCIB, empowered to discuss needs and capabilities of the departments and agencies for the procurement of foreign publications.
3. Close coordination among various channels of procurement, notably ASDIC and the Department of State, would be essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the attached Plan for Procurement of Foreign Publications under Emergency Conditions be approved by the United States Intelligence Board.
2. That the departments and agencies concerned with foreign publications include in their emergency planning provision for requesting and receiving foreign publications, and, as appropriate, for assigning personnel to the Foreign Publications Center or to field procurement teams.

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Chairman, Committee on Procurement
of
Foreign Publications